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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the distributional properties of poverty measures which are 
discontinuous at the poverty line. It is shown that among all the additive poverty measures, only 
those measures with some discontinuous jump at the poverty line are such that it is optimal to 
allocate a given antipoverty budget either to the richest of the poor, or to the poorest of the poor, 
or to both. A special class of such poverty measures is an extension of the well-known 𝑃𝛼, the 
properties of which are investigated. 
 
Keywords: Poverty index; Antipoverty policy 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Poverty measures can be interpreted as gauging the social welfare losses when persons 
have low incomes.1 Two distinct aspects of such losses may be identified: the loss from being 
poor and the loss from being poorer. The loss from being poor arises whenever a person is too 
poor to acquire the poverty-level basket of goods. The loss from being poorer reflects the 
judgment that poverty is more severe the poorer a poor person is. The commonly-used poverty 
headcount ratio deals only with the first of these, while the 𝑃𝛼 class of poverty measures (Foster 
et al., 1984) deals only with the second. 
 In Section 2 of this paper we discuss the loss from being poor and seek to justify why the 
loss-from-poverty function might be discontinuous at the poverty line. The social welfare 
justification for this discontinuity harkens back to the linen shirt’ argument of Adam Smith and 
to the ‘capability’ concept advocated by Amartya Sen. 
 Section 3 amalgamates the notions of the loss from being poor and the loss from being 
poorer into a single loss-from-poverty function. We specify a general class of such functions and 
analyze the poverty-minimizing allocation of an antipoverty budget for this class. In previous 
work (Bourguignon and Fields, 1990) we showed that the optimal allocation using various 
poverty measures could be of three different types: (i) allocating all the budget to the poorest of 
the poor, whose needs are greatest; (ii) allocating all the budget to the richest of the poor, so that 
as many people as possible can escape poverty; or (iii) making a mixed allocation with part of 
the budget going to the poorest of the poor and part to the richest of the poor. We show in the 
present paper that, within a fairly general class of poverty measures, only those who are 
                                                          
1 For rotational convenience, throughout this paper ’person’ is the recipient unit and ’income' is the basis on which 
poverty and standard of living are based. 
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discontinuous at the poverty line—and thus exhibit some fixed loss from poverty—may be 
consistent with the third type of allocation, and we analyze the characteristics of that allocation. 
 Section 4 then develops a new extension of the 𝑃𝛼 index which is a special case of the 
general class analyzed in Section 3. This new 𝑃𝛼,𝛿 class retains all the axioms and derivative 
properties of the 𝑃𝛼 index, while also combining with them the insight reflected in the headcount 
ratio on the loss from being poor. This fixed loss from poverty causes the ‘generalized 𝑃𝛿𝛼 ' class 
to exhibit allocative properties which may be quite different from those implied by the standard 
𝑃𝛼 measure, and which may be more appealing for practical use in public finance. 
 Remarks and extensions appear in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Justification for a discontinuous social loss-from-poverty function at the poverty line 
 
 A long-standing debate in the poverty literature is whether poverty is a discrete or a 
continuous phenomenon.2 Since this paper investigates the implications of regarding the social 
loss from poverty as discontinuous at the poverty line, it is important to consider on what 
fundamental social welfare grounds such a discontinuity may be justified. 
 Let us stress first that the very fact that the social observer, or planner, may be interested 
in poverty rather than, more generally, in the income distribution throughout society reveals that 
being in poverty is qualitatively different from having a low income in the observer’s social 
valuation of income. In particular, individual incomes matter below some line 𝑧 and they do not 
matter above it. This implies that the social loss from poverty is unaffected by income changes 
among the non-poor; what matters are redistributions to the poor from the non-poor and 
                                                          
2 See, for instance, Atkinson (1987), Lewis and Ulph (1988), and Lipton and Ravallion (1995). 
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redistributions among the poor. In the additively separable case with which we work in this 
paper, this means that the social loss from poverty is zero for incomes above the poverty line and 
positive for incomes below it. 
 The preceding argument says that the practice of focusing on the poor segment of the 
population rather than on the whole population is not in contradiction with assuming 
discontinuity of the social loss from poverty. But it is also consistent with continuous loss-from-
poverty functions. This is in fact the presentation adopted in the recent literature which applies to 
poverty the same ‘social dominance' concepts as those developed in the field of income 
distribution comparisons (e.g. Atkinson, 1987; Foster and Shorrocks, 1988; Ravallion, 1994). 
 The arguments in favor of a discontinuity are based on the idea that a minimum income is 
needed for an individual to perform ‘normally’ in a given environment and society. Below that 
income level some basic function of physical or social life cannot be fulfilled and the individual 
is somehow excluded from society, either in a physical sense (e.g. the long-run effects of an 
insufficient diet) or in a social sense (e.g. the ostracism against individuals not wearing the 
proper clothes, or having the proper consumption behavior). 
 This idea goes back to Adam Smith. Amartya Sen is fond of quoting Smith as follows: 
“In the present time, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be 
ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt.” Sen himself adds: “On the space of the 
capabilities themselves - the direct constituent of the standard of living - escape from poverty has 
an absolute requirement, to wit, avoidance of this type of shame. Not so much having equal 
shame as others, but just not being ashamed, absolutely” (Sen, 1983, p. 335). 
 As we interpret the linen shirt argument, it has two powerful implications. First, an 
individual too poor to be able to buy a linen shirt suffers shame absolutely, i.e. either he has the 
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means to buy the linen shirt and does so and is proud, or else he lacks the means to buy the shirt 
and suffers shame. Secondly, the shame he suffers is discrete-he suffers a full amount of shame 
even if he is only epsilon short of being able to buy the shirt. 
 It is in fact difficult to find in the literature a formal justification of the discontinuity 
analyzed in the present paper, even in the numerous writings by Sen. The reason may be that the 
linen shirt argument, or the capability approach to welfare, or the 'basic needs' concept, all lead, 
to a large extent, to a critique of the standard utilitarian-like social welfare approach to 
distributive issues. Our point here is precisely that, starting from the utilitarian framework, a step 
in the right direction pointed out by these remarks may be to introduce a discontinuity in the 
conventional social valuation of income, or a ‘fixed loss’ from poverty which arises in addition 
to the income-dependent ‘variable loss’ from poverty. 
 A good illustration of all the preceding points is provided by the familiar empirical Linear 
Expenditure System (LES) used in studies of household consumption behavior and their welfare 
implications. The LES consumption model is based on the Stone-Geary utility function: 
𝑢(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) = ∑ 𝛽𝑖 log(𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑖
 
where 𝑥𝑖 is the quantity consumed of good 𝑖(= 1,2, … , 𝑛), 𝛽𝑖 are positive parameters and 𝑐𝑖 can 
be interpreted as some ‘minimum’ consumption of good 𝑖. When estimating and then using this 
model in the analysis of distributive issues, it must be assumed that all individuals have a 
consumption budget above the minimum, 𝑅0, required to buy the ‘minimum’ bundle 
(𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛), i.e. if 𝑝𝑖 is the price of good 𝑖, then 𝑅0 = Σ𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑖. What should be done if this 
assumption proves to be unrealistic? What must be done with the people whose budgets fall 
Discontinuous Losses from Poverty        7 
 
below that limit?3 They may be considered precisely as poor. However, their consumption 
budget or their income clearly cannot be used as an index of their welfare in the same way as for 
households above the limit 𝑅0 since they cannot have preferences represented by the LES model. 
If they cannot be compared with people who receive 𝑅0 or slightly more then there is no reason 
to assume that their welfare level is the same as those people’s when their own income tends 
toward 𝑅0 from below. This is where we believe that some discontinuity must be introduced, 
although the extent of that discontinuity, i.e. the fixed social loss from poverty, must be set by 
the observer. 
 It is on that basis that we now consider a new class of poverty measures in which such a 
discontinuity is explicitly taken into account. 
 
3. The general class of ‘poverty line discontinuous’ poverty measures 
 
 Let us consider a distribution of incomes among a population of N individual 
consumption units defined as (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑁) where, without loss of generality 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ <
𝑦𝑁. Let (𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑞) be the restriction of the previous distribution to the ‘poor segment’ of the 
population, in other words, q is the number of poor and we have that 𝑦1 < 𝑦2 < ⋯ < 𝑦𝑞 < 𝑧 <
𝑦𝑞+1, where 𝑧 is the poverty line. We consider in this paper the general class of additively 
separable poverty measures, the form of which is given by 
𝑃𝐿(𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑁) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐿(𝑦𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
                                                          
3 Nothing prevents this from happening at the estimation stage. Most authors using this type of model now indicate 
the percentage of households in this situation in their sample. 
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where 𝐿(∙) is continuous, differentiable, non-increasing and (strictly) convex over the interval 
[0, 𝑧[, and 𝐿(𝑦) = 0 over the interval [𝑧, ∞[. It is through the latter restriction that the poverty 
measure 𝑃𝐿(∙) is defined only on the poor segment of the population, and independent of the 
distribution of income among the non-poor. With that restriction, the function 𝐿(∙) is to be 
interpreted as the social loss from the ith individual’s poverty discussed in the preceding section, 
and 𝑃𝐿(∙) as the mean social loss. One can check that members of the 𝑃𝐿(∙) class defined by (1) 
satisfy monotonicity, subgroup consistency and decomposability.4 
 That 𝐿(∙) is non-increasing guarantees that poverty cannot go up when the income of a 
poor person increases, whereas convexity implies that an increase of a given size in the income 
of a poor person reduces poverty by more the poorer the income recipient is. 
 The family of measures given by (1) includes the poverty gap, the popular 𝑃𝛼 measures, 
and what Hagenaars (1987) called the 'Dalton class’ (which includes, inter alia, the Watts index). 
The poverty gap obtains with 𝐿(𝑥) = (𝑧 − 𝜇)/𝑧, where 𝜇 is the mean income of the poor, 𝑃𝛼 
measures correspond to 𝐿(𝑥) = [(𝑧 − 𝑥)/𝑧]𝛼, and the Dalton class to 𝐿(𝑥) = [𝑢(𝑧) − 𝑢(𝑥)]/
𝑢(𝑧), where 𝑢 is increasing and concave.5 Among the poverty measures that do not satisfy the 
preceding properties are the headcount ratio, the Sen index—and other measures derived from 
it—and the first family of indices proposed by Clark et al. (1981). As shown in Fig. 1(a), the 
implicit loss function in the headcount ratio is not decreasing and not strictly convex, whereas 
the inclusion of the Gini coefficient in the Sen index is equivalent to allowing the loss from 
poverty to depend not only on one’s income but also on that of the other poor people. The reason 
is that unlike (1), the Sen index is not additively separable (see Section 5 below). Note though 
                                                          
4 For definitions and discussions of these concepts, see Sen (1973), Foster et al. (1984), and Foster and Shorrocks 
(1991). 
5 It is well known that the poverty gap is 𝑃𝛼 with 𝛼 = 1. Note also that only 𝑃𝛼. with 𝛼 > 1, are relevant here 
because of the strict convexity requirement in (1). 
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that this requirement in (1) may be somewhat attenuated by taking some monotonic 
transformation on the RHS of (1). Most of what follows actually applies to that wider class of 
‘weakly additive’ poverty measures which, except for the convexity and differentiability 
requirement on the functions 𝐿(∙), coincides with the family of ‘subgroup consistent poverty 
indices’ defined in Foster and Shorrocks (1991). 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 
 Following the argument in the preceding section, an important subclass of poverty 
measures which we emphasize in this paper is made up of functions of type (1), where 𝐿(𝑦) is 
discontinuous at the poverty line 𝑧 with 𝐿(𝑧−) = 𝛿 and 𝐿(𝑧) = 0, and 𝐿(𝑧−) is the limit of 𝐿(𝑦) 
when 𝑦 tends towards 𝑧 from below. We shall call this subclass of (1) the ‘poverty-line-
discontinuous’ (PLD) class of measures—see Fig. 1(c). 
 We now investigate the properties of the general class of poverty measures (1) and that of 
the PLD subclass. We begin by investigating the optimal allocation of a given anti-poverty 
budget 𝐵, i.e. the allocation leading to the least poverty, as defined by a measure of type (1) or 
PLD.6 As analyzed in a previous paper (Bourguignon and Fields, 1990), that optimal allocation 
may be of different types. It may be ‘p-type’, with all the budget 𝐵 going to the poorest of the 
poor, or ‘r-type’ with all the budget being used to lift the richest of the poor out of poverty, i.e. to 
give them a final income equal to 𝑧. In some instances, it may also be ‘mixed-type’, i.e. a 
                                                          
6 We only consider in this section the case of perfect targeting, i.e. the case where all transfers may be chanelled to 
specific individuals in the poor population without leakages. Imperfect targeting situations are considered in Section 
5. 
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mixture of p-type and r-type. We shall show that in the family (1) of poverty measures, only the 
PLD subclass may lead to optimal allocations of the mixed-type. 
 Formally, the optimal allocation program is defined by 
min 𝑃𝐿(𝑦1 + 𝑡1, 𝑦2 + 𝑡2, … , 𝑦𝑁 + 𝑡𝑁)|𝑡1 + 𝑡2 +∙∙∙ +𝑡𝑁 ≤ 𝐵,  with 𝑡𝑖 ≥ 0, ∀𝑖 
Here, 𝑡𝑖 is the income transfer made to individual 𝑖. It is required to be non-negative for all 
individuals, so that we do not really consider the way the antipoverty budget 𝐵 is financed. This 
may be through taxes on all individuals, in which case 𝑦𝑖, is to be interpreted as income net of 
taxes. But 𝐵 may also be some exogenous transfer made to the population, e.g. foreign aid. It 
may also be noted that, if 𝑃𝐿 belongs to the family of poverty measures (1), then optimal 
transfers to the non-poor in (2) are zero, so that 𝐵 may actually be financed as a tax on the non-
poor. In any case, we shall take it for granted in what follows that 𝑡𝑖, is zero for 𝑖 > 𝑞 and we 
shall consider only the determination of optimal transfers to the poor. 
 Our interest lies in the way the optimal transfer vector 𝑡∗ depends on the function 𝐿(∙) 
that defines the poverty measure 𝑃𝐿(∙). It is easily shown, for instance, that with 𝑃𝛼 and 𝛼 > 1, it 
is optimal to transfer the entire antipoverty budget to the poorest of the poor. The transfer thus is 
‘p-type’ with 
𝑡𝑖
∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑦𝑖  ;       for 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑗 
where 𝑎 and 𝑗 are given by 
𝑦𝑗+1 > 𝑎 > 𝑦𝑖;        ∑(𝑎 − 𝑦1) = 𝐵
𝑖
𝑖=1
 
Of course, this definition is valid only for a budget 𝐵 that does not permit all the poor to be lifted 
out of poverty. 
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 If we now consider the headcount ratio—which, as already noted, does not belong to the 
family of measures defined by (1)—the optimal transfer would be r-type and defined by 
𝑡𝑖
∗ = (𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖)    for 𝑖 = 𝑞, 𝑞 − 1, 𝑞 − 2, … , 𝑞 − 𝑗 
where 𝑗 is given by 
∑ (𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖) = 𝐵
𝑞
𝑖=𝑞−𝑗
 
It must be noted, though, that this argument is valid only if 𝐵 is exactly equal to that amount 
necessary to lift out of poverty an integer number of poor. In the case, for instance, where 
∑ (𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖) = 𝑏𝑗−1 < 𝐵 < 𝑏𝑗 =
𝑞
𝑖=𝑞−𝑗+1
∑ (𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖)
𝑞
𝑖=𝑞−𝑗
 
only 𝑗 − 1 poor can be lifted out of poverty, whereas there is some ‘remainder’ to be allocated. 
In the present case, the remainder is 𝑅 = 𝐵 − 𝑏𝑗−𝑡. With the headcount ratio or the poverty gap, 
it does not matter how that remainder is allocated, but in the case of strictly convex loss 
functions in [0, 𝑧[, it would clearly be allocated to the poorest of the poor. We shall ignore that 
small imprecision in what follows by adopting a weak definition of the r-type transfer. 
 Definition of p-type, r-type and mixed-type transfers. (a) A transfer is pure p-type if it is 
entirely spent on the poorest of the poor so as to raise as many of them as possible to a common 
income above their initial one. (b) A transfer is p-type if some but not necessarily all of it is spent 
on the poorest of the poor, (c) A transfer is pure r-type if it is used to lift as many of the richest 
of the poor out of poverty as possible, (d) A transfer is r-type if some but not necessarily all of it 
is spent to lift the richest of the poor out of poverty, (e) A transfer is mixed-type if some but not 
all of it is spent to raise the incomes of the poorest of the poor and some but not as much as 
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possible of it is spent to lift the richest of the poor out of poverty; that is, a mixed transfer 
consists of both p-type and r-type transfers. 
 Given these definitions, the first question we ask is: Under what conditions on the 
function 𝐿(∙) might a mixed transfer be optimal for some antipoverty budget 𝐵? The answer to 
that question is given in the following three propositions. 
 
Proposition 1. Among poverty measures of type (1) only PLD measures may lead to an optimal 
allocation of an antipoverty budget B of mixed-type. 
 
Proof. Consider an optimal mixed type transfer. The poor fall into three categories: (i) those 
receiving a strictly positive transfer but still remaining below the poverty line (𝐼); (ii) those who 
receive a strictly positive transfer which just enables them to escape poverty (𝐽);7 and (iii) those 
who do not receive any transfer at all (𝐾). For such a transfer to be optimal, it must be the case 
that reducing the transfer to any poor 𝑖 ∈ 𝐽 by any (positive) arbitrary small amount 𝛽 and 
increasing by the same amount that of another poor 𝑚 ∈ 𝐼 increases overall poverty. The change 
in the poverty measure corresponding to that transfer is given by 
∆𝑃𝐿 = −𝐿(𝑧) + 𝐿(𝑧 − 𝛽) + 𝛽𝐿
′(𝑦𝑚 + 𝑡𝑚) 
where the first two terms on the RHS correspond to individual 𝑖 coming back into the pool of 
poor. Since the loss function is zero at 𝑧 for all measures satisfying (1), optimality requires that 
𝐿(𝑧 − 𝛽)|𝛽 > −𝐿′(𝑦𝑚 + 𝑡𝑚) 
The differentiability of 𝐿(∙) on [0, 𝑧[ implies that 
                                                          
7 Since there is no gain in 𝑃𝐿(∙) from moving.individuals strictly above the poverty line, individuals in (𝐽) must end 
up exactly at the poverty line, 𝑧. 
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lim
𝛽→0
𝐿(𝑧 − 𝛽) = 𝐿(𝑧−) − 𝛽. 𝐿′(𝑧−) 
where 𝐿(𝑧−) and 𝐿′(𝑧−) are, respectively, the limits of the loss function 𝐿(𝑦) and its derivative 
when 𝑦 tends towards the poverty line 𝑧 from below. After dividing by 𝛽, the inequality above 
becomes 
lim
𝛽→0
𝐿(𝑧−)|𝛽 > 𝐿′(𝑧−) − 𝐿′(𝑦𝑚 + 𝑡𝑚) 
But the RHS is strictly positive if 𝐿(𝑦) is strictly convex. Hence 𝐿′(𝑧−) must be strictly positive 
if the optimal allocation is of the mixed-type. Q.E.D. 
 Now that we have shown that only PLD measures can lead to mixed transfers, we 
investigate under what conditions they actually do and in addition, when the optimal transfer is 
pure-r or pure-p type. We consider first the case of income distributions which are continuous in 
a neighborhood of the poverty line 𝑧. In other words, we assume for now that there is an 
individual with an income infinitely close to (and below) 𝑧. 
 
Proposition 2. For all PLD poverty measures and all income distributions continuous in the 
neighborhood of 𝑧, there exists a critical level 𝐵, of the antipoverty budget such that the optimal 
allocation is (a) pure r-type if 𝐵 ≤ 𝐵𝑟 and (b) mixed-type if 𝐵 > 𝐵𝑟. The critical level 𝐵𝑟 is 
defined in Eq. (4) below. 
 
Proof. By assumption, 𝐿(∙) is decreasing, strictly convex and tends towards 𝛿 > 0 as 𝑦 tends 
towards 𝑧 from below. Let us first show that, under the assumption of a continuous income 
distribution, the first cents of any antipoverty budget (∈) must be allocated in an r-type manner. 
Let ∈= 𝑧 − 𝑦𝑞 which, by continuity, is infinitely small. Without very much loss of generality, let 
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us assume that ∈< (𝑦2 − 𝑦1).
8 Under these conditions, e should be allocated to the poorest of the 
poor if the following condition is satisfied: 
∈∙ 𝐿′(𝑦1) < −𝐿(𝑦𝑞)(< −𝛿) 
This condition requires that the fall in poverty as a result of increasing the income of the poorest 
individual by ∈ be larger (in absolute value) than that as a result of lifting the richest individual 
out of poverty. However, because the richest poor person is assumed to be infinitely close to the 
poverty line and because there is a non-infinitesimal gain in welfare when that person escapes 
poverty, this condition cannot hold. By continuity, this shows that for an antipoverty budget 
small enough, the optimal transfer is necessarily pure r-type. 
 Until what point is this true? Assume that some amount has already been spent on r-type 
transfers so that there no poor person between the income level 𝑦0 and the poverty line 𝑧. 
Keeping with an r-type strategy implies spending the next 𝑧 − 𝑦0 dollars on the richest of the 
poor, whereas making a p-type transfer would involve spending that amount on the poorest of the 
poor. The drop in poverty obtained by using those 𝑧 − 𝑦0 dollars for an r-type transfer is simply 
𝐿(𝑦0), whereas that obtained by using these dollars for a p-type transfer is given as follows. 
First, raise the poorest individual (whose income is 𝑦1) to the next individual, then raise those 
two individuals to the next individual, and so on until the budget is exhausted. Denote the 
number of individuals whose incomes are so raised by 𝑖0 and the amount to which their incomes 
are raised by 𝑦0. Then the 𝑖th individual's loss from poverty is reduced by 𝐿(𝑦𝑖) − 𝐿(𝑦0), and 
overall poverty is reduced by: 
𝑀(𝑦0) = ∑[𝐿(𝑦𝑖) − 𝐿(𝑦0)]
𝑖0
𝑖=1
 
                                                          
8 If this were not the case, then the allocation of € among the poorest persons should be taken into account. 
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where   𝑦0 ∈ [𝑦𝑖0 , 𝑦𝑖0+1];     ∑(𝑦0 − 𝑦𝑖) = 𝑧 − 𝑦
0
𝑖0
𝑖=1
 
Note that, unlike in the proof of Proposition 1, the marginal loss function 𝐿′(∙) is no longer what 
matters. This is because many people at the top of the distribution of income among the poor 
have already been lifted out of poverty and the amount 𝑧 − 𝑦0 to be allocated to the poorest is 
not infinitesimally small. 
 The income threshold at which it is no longer optimal to transfer to the richest of the poor 
is given by the equality between 𝐿(𝑦0) and 𝑀(𝑦0). We denote this threshold by 𝑦∗, the number 
of poor individuals who receive r-type transfers by 𝑗∗, and the number of poor individuals who 
would benefit from p-type transfers by 𝑖∗. The critical budget level 𝐵𝑟 such that the optimal 
budget allocation switches from a pure r-type to a mixed-type is defined with reference to a 
threshold income 𝑦∗ given by 
𝐿(𝑦∗) = ∑[𝐿(𝑦𝑖) − 𝐿(𝑦0)]
𝑖∗
𝑖=1
 
where   𝑦0 ∈ [𝑦𝑖∗ , 𝑦𝑖∗+1];     ∑(𝑦0 − 𝑦𝑖) =
𝑖∗
𝑖=1
𝑧 − 𝑦∗ 
through the relationship 
𝐵𝑟 = ∑(𝑧 − 𝑦𝑖)
𝑞
𝑖=𝑗∗
,     𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑗∗−1 < 𝑦
∗ < 𝑦𝑗 
 It remains to show whether 𝐿(𝑦0) and 𝑀( 0) can in fact be equated. The necessary 
analysis is performed with the aid of Fig. 2. 
 As noted above, the 𝐿(𝑦0) function is the welfare gain from using an antipoverty budget 
of 𝑧 − 𝑦0 dollars to make an r-type transfer to a person with income 𝑦0. This is simply the 𝐿(𝑦) 
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function, i.e. it is decreasing, strictly convex, and tends towards 𝛿 > 0 as 𝑦 tends towards 𝑧 from 
below. The 𝑀(𝑦0) function is the welfare gain from using an antipoverty budget of 𝑧 − 𝑦0 
dollars to make a p-type transfer to the poorest of the poor. We know that 
lim
𝑦0→𝑧
𝑀(𝑦0) = 0 
because at z, no money is available to give to the poorest of the poor. As y° falls, M(y") 
increases, because more and more money is available to give to the poor. The concavity of M(y°) 
can be proved in the case of a continuous distribution from the fact that M'(y') = L‘(y„), where y„ 
is defined in (3), and clearly is a decreasing function of y°. Finally, the L(y") curve is always 
flatter than the M(y°) curve, i.e. |T’(y0)| < |A/'(y°)|, Vy"; this follows from the fact that the gain 
from a dollar going to the richest of the poor while he is still poor is less than the gain from an 
extra dollar going to the poorest of the poor. 
